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JURISDICTION
Respondent, ("Kennecott"), agrees with the statement of
jurisdiction contained in petitioner's brief,

Kennecott will

not in this brief restate the jurisdiction of the court to hear
this appeal.
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This appeal by the County Board of Equalization of Salt
Lake County (the "County"), is from a formal decision of the
Utah State Tax Commission, (the "Commission").

In that deci-

sion the Commission determined that the County had improperly
changed the assessment of property owned by Kennecott, and
leased to Hercules Incorporated

("Hercules"), so as to deny

assessment of that property as agricultural under the Utah
Farmland Assessment Act, Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-501 et seq.
(1987).

The property consists of approximately 3,990 acres

owned by Kennecott, which is leased both to Hercules and to two
farm and ranch operations for grazing beef cattle and growing
red winter wheat.

The decision of the Commission determining

that this property was to be assessed under the Utah Farmland
Assessment Act, supra, was issued on September 10, 1987. Petition for Writ of Review was filed by the County on October 8,
1987.

The Writ of Review was issued on October 8, 1987.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the County erroneously remove the property

subject to this appeal from assessment under the Utah Farmland
Assessment Act, even though that land is actively used for
agricultural production?
2.

If

the

property

is

otherwise

qualified

for

assessment under the Utah Farmland Assessment Act, does the
property become disqualified

because

it is also

leased to

Hercules?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

property

subject

to

this appeal

consists of

approximately 3,990 acres, in 14 parcels, surrounding a rocket
motor manufacturing
1985.
ing

plant being

constructed by Hercules in

The parcel upon which Hercules1 rocket motor manufactur-

facility

is

located

is

also

leased

by Hercules

from

Kennecott, under the same lease as is the property which is the
subject of this appeal.
Fifteen hundred (1500) acres of the property involved
in this appeal are also leased by Kennecott to Don Rushton, who
grows red winter wheat on that property.

The remainder of the

3,990 acres of property is leased to Johnson Cattle Company,
along

with

property.

approximately

11,000

other

acres

of

Kennecott

Johnson Cattle Company grazes beef cattle on this

property.
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Despite
agricultural

qualification

assessmentr

of

Kennecott's

property

the County arbitrarily,

for

and without

justification, removed the property leased to Don Rushton and
Johnson Cattle Company from assessment under the Utah Farmland
Assessment

Act.

For many

property was assessed

years prior

to

by the County under

1985

the

subject

the Utah Farmland

Assessment Act because it was used for agricultural purposes.
(Rec. 89, 584-590, 591-594).
County

would

not

assess

After receiving notice that the

this

property

under

the

Farmland

Assessment Act in 1985, even though it had done so for at least
two years prior to 1985, Kennecott

filed a notice of appeal

with the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization, which Board
denied Kennecott the relief it sought. (Rec. 103-109).

There-

after, Kennecott appealed that denial to the Commission.
The

Commission,

on

September

3,

1986,

issued

an

informal decision reversing the County's decision and determining that

the land was actively devoted

to agricultural use,

including grazing beef cattle and growing grain, and that as
such, was subject to valuation and assessment under the Utah
Farmland Assessment Act pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. S 59-5-90

(Supp. 1986).

(Rec. 88-95).

The Commission

further determined that Hercules' rights to the subject property, under its lease with Kennecott, did not preclude assessment of this property under the provisions of the Utah Farmland
Assessment

Act.

(Rec.

92).

The
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specific

finding

of

the

Commission was that Hercules, under its lease, had only the
right to restrict the construction of habitable buildings by
Kennecott, or any other person, on the property, and that the
property was fully subject to being leased or otherwise devoted
to agricultural use by Kennecott. (Rec. 92).
The County then filed a petition for formal hearing
with the Commission.
1986.

A formal hearing was held on December 30,

On September 10, 1987 the Commission issued its formal

decision

determining

that

the

property

was

qualified

for

assessment under the Utah Farmland Assessment Act and ordered
the Salt Lake County Assessor to assess the land as agricultural property and to continue so assessing the land under the
Utah Farmland Assessment Act until the property failed to meet
the requirements of that Act. (Rec. 44-52). The County thereupon filed a petition for writ of review.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The approximate 3,990 acres which are the subject of
this appeal are owned by Kennecott and are leased by Kennecott
to Don Rushton, to Johnson Cattle Company and to Hercules.
(Rec. 44-52, 88-95, 584-590, 591-594).

In addition to this

property which is leased to Hercules, Kennecott also leases an
additional
542-551).

317

acre parcel

to Hercules.

(Rec. 47, 88-89,

Upon this additional parcel Hercules was construct-

ing, at the time of assessment, a rocket motor manufacturing
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facility. (Rec. 47, 88-89, 542-551).
rocket motor manufacturing

The parcel upon which the

facility was being

constructed

is

not part of this appeal, and neither Kennecott nor Hercules is
asserting that this 317 acre parcel is properly qualified for
assessment under the Utah Farmland Assessment Act. (Rec. 47,
88-89, 542-551).
In addition to leasing this 317 acre site, Hercules
determined

it needed

to be able to restrict

activities upon

surrounding property so as to preclude any habitable buildings
being constructed and to foreclose the storage of explosives or
flammable materials. (Rec. 44-52, 88-95, 622-23).

As a result,

in addition to the 317 acre site for the rocket motor manufacturing facility, Hercules also leased from Kennecott approximately
only

3,600 acres surrounding

restrictions

the manufacturing

in Hercules'

lease with

site.

Kennecott

The

on

the

property surrounding Hercules' manufacturing facility was that
no habitable buildings could be constructed, and no explosives
or flammable materials could be stored. (Rec. 622-623).
uses of
Kennecott

this property
may

restricted.
Kennecott

lease,

by

including

(Rec. 92).

retained

the

Kennecott,

or

by

agricultural

persons

Other

to whom

uses, were

not

Thus, under its lease with Hercules,
right

to either

actively

devote

the

property to agricultural use itself, or to lease the property
to farmers and ranchers for agricultural use.
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(Rec. 622-623.)

Kennecott has actively devoted this property, before
its lease to Hercules, to agricultural use and production by
leasing it to Johnson Cattle Company and to Don Rushton. (Rec.
92, 584-590, 591-594).

Johnson Cattle Company has grazed beef

cattle on a part of the property, Don Rushton has grown red
winter wheat on the other portion of the property. (Rec. 92,
584-590,

591-594).

Kennecott's

Agricultural

use

continued

after

lease to Hercules. (Rec. 92, 584-590, 591-594).

There is no dispute that the property which is the subject of
this appeal

is used by Kennecott's

lessees, Johnson Cattle

Company and Don Rushton, for agricultural purposes. (Rec. 92,
584-590,

591-594).

Hercules'

lease

with Kennecott

merely

operates much in the same fashion as does a restrictive covenant.

(Rec. 92).

Kennecott

may use the property

for any

purpose it desires just so long as no habitable structures are
constructed,

and

no

explosives

stored on the property.

or

flammable

materials

are

(Rec. 622-623).

The Commission, after an informal, and a subsequent
formal hearing, determined that the property was qualified for
assessment under the Utah Farmland Assessment Act.

The Commis-

sion found that the property fully complied with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-87 (Supp. 1986), as follows:
3.
Although the land owner must
apply for FAA assessment, if the land is
actively devoted to agricultural use, is
five contiguous acres or more in area, and
has a gross income from agricultural
activities of at least $1000 per year, the

land is to be valued at the value which the
land has for agricultural use if it has
been held in agricultural use for at least
two years at the time of application. Utah
Code Ann. S 59-5-87 (Supp. 1966).
4.
Grazing beef cattle and growing
grain crops are agricultural uses.
Utah
Code Ann. S 59-5-88 (1953). (Rec. 49-50).
The Commission determined that the County had erroneously and improperly assessed the property, and directed the
County to assess the property as property devoted to an agricultural

use

under

Utah's

Farmland

Assessment

Act,

and

to

continue to so assess that property until it was removed from
agricultural use. (Rec. 49-51).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The
leased

to

Company,

property

Hercules,

is qualified

owned

and

by

to Don

Kennecott,
Rushton

for assessment

and

concurrently

and Johnson

Cattle

under the Utah Farmland

Assessment Act because that property is being actively used for
grazing beef cattle and growing red winter wheat.

As such, it

is property which is "actively devoted to an agricultural use."
The property also provides a buffer zone between a
rocket motor manufacturing facility and other habitable structures, or other property upon which habitable structures can be
constructed.

Hercules leases the property in order to restrict

the construction of habitable buildings on property surrounding
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its rocket motor manufacturing facility pursuant to the provisions of federal, state and local law.

This is done for safety

purposes by Hercules.
Hercules' lease rights only restrict construction of
habitable buildings, or the storage of explosives or flammable
materials.

The property may be used by Kennecott under its

lease with Hercules for any other purpose whatsoever, and is so
used by Kennecott under its leases with Johnson Cattle Company
and Don Rushton for grazing beef cattle and growing red winter
wheat.

The lease to Hercules by Kennecott does not disqualify

the property for assessment under Utah's Farmland Assessment
statute.
As

a

result,

the

Tax

Commission

was

correct

in

determining that this property met the qualifications of the
Utah Farmland Assessment Act and was to be assessed under that
statute.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PROPERTY LEASED BY KENNECOTT TO
HERCULES WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS
APPEAL, WHICH IS ALSO LEASED TO JOHNSON
CATTLE COMPANY AND DON RUSHTON, IS USED BY
KENNECOTT, BY HERCULES, BY JOHNSON CATTLE
COMPANY, AND BY DON RUSHTON FOR AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES AND SHOULD BE ASSESSED UNDER
THE UTAH FARMLAND ASSESSMENT ACT.
Utah Code Ann. $ 59-5-87 (Supp. 1986), provides that

land which is actively devoted to an agricultural use, which is
greater than five contiguous acres in area, and which provides
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a gross income of $1,000 per year, not including rental income,
is, upon application by the owner, to be assessed as agricultural
11

property.

Utah

Code

Ann.

S

59-5-88

(1974)

defines

actively devoted to an agricultural use" as follows:
Land shall be deemed to be in agricultural use when devoted to the raising of
plants and animals useful to man, including
but not limited to: forages and sod crops;
grains and feed crops; dairy animals, poultry, livestock,
including beef cattle,
• . •

Thus, if property which is in excess of five acres in
area is used by the owner, or another with the permission of
the owner, for raising beef cattle, or growing grain,

it is

qualified for assessment under the Utah Farmland Assessment Act
so long as the property has been so used for at least two years
prior to the assessment year, and the property produces gross
revenue in excess of $1,000 per year as a result of the agricultural use.
There is no question in this case that the approximately 3,990 acres which are subject to this appeal meet these
qualifications.
acres

The

property

in area, produces

from

is more

than

five

contiguous

its agricultural use more than

$1,000 gross income per year, and has been used for agricultural production for at least two years prior to the date of
the assessment year here at issue, 1985.

(Rec. pp. 49-51)

The situation presented by this case is very similar
to the situation presented to the Oregon Supreme Court in Ritch

-9-

v. Department of Revenue. 261 Or. 78, 493 P.2d 38 (1972).
Ritch

In

approximately 96f000 acres were leased by an agency of

the State of Oregon to Boeing Corporation for "industrial or
Id.,

industrial research and development purposes."
40.

493 P.2d

In that case, Boeing granted subleases for agricultural

purposes to four ranchers living in the general area.
approximately

96,000

acres,

Boeing

subleased

94,000 acres for agricultural purposes.

Of the

approximately

The remaining

2,000

acres were used by Boeing for industrial development.

There

was

these

no

application

made

for

farm

use

assessment

on

remaining 2,000 acres.
The lower court denied to the owner of the property,
the Department

of Veterans Affairs, special farm use assess-

ment. In the Ritch case, the lease to Boeing by the Department
of Veterans Affairs did not prohibit use of a portion of the
property

for

agricultural

purposes.

Furthermore,

in

Ritch

Boeing desired a large tract of ground as a "buffer zone for
noise suppression between test areas and privately owned property."

id., 493 p.2d 41.
The

Ritch

because

the

land

became

industrial

court,

was

used

in

addressing

as an

property

not

the

industrial
qualified

argument
buffer

for

zone

it

agricultural

assessment, stated as follows:
For purposes of applying the farm use statute, we do not believe that Boeing's reason
for wanting 96,000 acres is as important as
the use that is actually being made of the
-10-

that

property.
As of 1969, the tax year
involved herein, 94,000 acres were actually
being used for farm purposes. [Emphasis
added], Id.
This case presents a situation almost
that presented
Hercules

in Ritch.

approximately

identical to

In this case Kennecott

3600

leases to

acres which Hercules desires

in

order to buffer Hercules1 activities as a rocket motor manufacturer from surrounding property.

Hercules does this so that no

habitable structures will be adversely
activities.
agricultural

impacted by Hercules1

However, just as in Ritch, where Boeing permitted
activities

to

occur

on

the

property

which

it

leased from the state as an industrial buffer zone, Hercules
permits agricultural use on its leased property.

As a result,

just as in Ritch, the property is "actively devoted to an agricultural use."
The County argues that because this ground is subject
to a lease to Hercules, the property
devoted to an agricultural use".

is not being

"actively

However, the use to which the

property is being put is agricultural.

There was agricultural

production on this property in the assessment year, and for at
least two years prior thereto.

Kennecott believes the language

from Ritch by the Oregon Supreme Court may provide guidance in
this case.

In determining that the property in Ritch was qual-

ified for farm land assessment under the Oregon statute, the
Oregon Supreme Court stated as follows:
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Apparently the plaintiff's primary objection to the lands receiving a farm use
classification is that neither the Department of Veterans' Affairs, as the owner,
nor Boeing Company, as the lessee, is the
one who is doing the actual farming on the
lands. Farm lands are not rendered ineligible for farm use classification merely
because they are subject to a lease or a
sublease.
[Emphasis added.]
It is not
necessary that the owner of the lands be
the one who prepares the soil and harvests
the crop.
If this were true, then many
prime farm lands in the state would be
denied farm use classification because of
the ownership of the land, not because of
the use of the land. It is true that ORS
308.375 requires the application for special farm use assessment for unzoned farm
lands to be made by the owner for farm use
classification.
ORS 308.380 commands the
county assessor to consider "the use of the
land by the owner, renter or operator" in
determining entitlement to special farm use
classification.
Throughout all the statutes relating to farm use assessment for
both zoned and unzoned farm lands, all
references are to the lands and the use
thereof, e.g., agricultural lands, lands
devoted to farm use, [emphasis added] operation of the lands according to agricultural practices, and income from farm use
of the land. Id. 493 P.2d 41-42.
This is precisely what is occurring

in this case.

The land at issue has co-ownership, just as the land in Ritch
had co-ownership.

Hercules is a lessee of Kennecott.

Hercules

and Kennecott lease the property to farmers and ranchers for
agricultural use.

The land is used for agricultural purposes

and is, as a result, "actively devoted to an agricultural use."
A case similar to this case and to Ritch was decided
in 1968 by the Connecticut Supreme Court.
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In Marshall v. Town

of Newinqton, 156 Conn. 107, 239 A.2d 478 (1968)f the Connecticut court considered the assessment of certain property under
Connecticut's Farmland Assessment

Act, where the property at

issue was zoned for industrial use, but was used for growing
corn.

In Marshall the landowner's principal source of income

from the property was not from the corn which was grown there,
but was from other sources.

239 A.2d 480-81.

In determining that the landowner's property qualified for assessment under the Connecticut Farm Land Assessment
Act, the Marshall court stated:
Obviously, the conclusion that the produce
raised on the plaintiffs' land was a minor
source of their total income from all
sources is completely irrelevant to the
question whether they were using a particular piece of land for farming purposes.
Equally irrelevant is a finding that adjacent industrial lands were sold for high
prices. Furthermore, although the conclusions that the highest and best use of a
particular parcel was for industrial purposes and that it was zoned for industrial
purposes at the request or instigation of
the owner would be relevant to a determination of the land's fair market value, such
conclusions are not relevant to a determination as to whether in fact the land is
being used for farming purposes. Id., 239
A.2d 481.
And further:
From this examination, the conclusion is
inescapable that the court's decision as to
a proper classification of the land was
predicated, not on the actual use to which
the land was being put, which is the
criterion the statute specifies, but on the
fact that its highest and best use would be
for industrial purposes and that at the
-13-

instigation of the plaintiffs it was in a
zone which would permit such a use. This
was error. Id.
In this case the land is being used,

in conformity

with all lease agreements, for agricultural purposes.

The land

is leased to a rancher in order to raise beef cattle, and is
leased to a farmer in order to raise red winter wheat.

It is

land which is "actively devoted to an agricultural use."

In

fact, Utah's Farmland Assessment Act requires that this land be
assessed for agricultural purposes.

The Act states as follows:

The assessor in valuing land which qualifies as land actively devoted to agricultural use under the test prescribed by this
act, and as to which the owner thereof has
made timely application
for valuation,
assessment and taxation hereunder for the
tax year in issue, shall consider only
those indicia of value which such land has
for agricultural use as determined by the
state tax commission.
Utah Code Ann.
S 59-5-90 (Supp. 1986).
Thus,
County

the

only

and

the

relevant
Tax

questions

Commission

may

which

the

inquire

assessor,
into

the

respecting

assessment under Utah's Farmland Assessment Act are as follows:
1.

What are the "tests prescribed by this Act"?

2.

Has the owner made a timely application for val-

uation, assessment and taxation for the tax year at issue?
The tests, for agricultural use, prescribed by the
statute, are clearly set out in Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-89 (Supp.
1986).

The requirements are that the land must:
(a)

Be not less than five contiguous acres in area;
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(b)

Be used for an agricultural purpose as defined

in the statute under Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-88 (1974); and
(c)

Produce a gross income from agricultural use of

at least $1,000 per yearf without regard to rental income.
Under Utah's Farmland Assessment Act the Utah legislature intended that property which is actively being used for
agricultural purposes is to be assessed under the Act regardless of any other use to which the property is being, or may
be, put.
Utah

This becomes clear when one examines the enabling

constitutional

provision

Assessment Act was enacted.

under which

the Utah

Farmland

That provision states as follows:

Land used for agricultural purposes may, as
the Legislature prescribes, be assessed
according to its value for agricultural use
without regard to the value it may have for
other purposes.
Utah Constitution, Art.
XIII, Sec. 3 (Supp. 1987).
The legislature has determined that if land in Utah
is used for agricultural purposes, that land is qualified for
assessment

under

the Utah Farmland Assessment

precisely what is presented in this case.

Act.

That

is

Kennecott's property

is used for an agricultural purpose, agricultural production is
occurring

on

that property

in every

year, and

the property

should be assessed under Utah's Farmland Assessment Act just as
the property in the Ritch case and the Marshall case were used
for agricultural

purposes

and were

property.
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assessed

as

agricultural

The County argues that because Kennecott derives substantial income from this property as a result of Kennecottfs
lease to Hercules, the property is not qualified for agricultural

assessment.

The

argument

is

that

this

means

the

property's primary, or main use, is industrial, not agricultural.

However, the Utah legislature has determined that other

uses to which property in agricultural use can, is, or may be,
put are not relevant in considering whether that land qualifies
for assessment under Utah's Farmland Assessment Act.

The leg-

islature set out a use test in Utah's Farmland Assessment Act.
In order to qualify for agricultural assessment, the property,
in simple terms, only needs to meet the use test set out in the
statute.

Consequently, although the arguments presented by the

County have some appeal, they are properly addressed
Utah legislature and not to this court.

to the

If the County desires

Utah's Farmland Assessment Act to be applied only to property
which

is primarily, mainly, or mostly used

for

agricultural

purposes, it should address those arguments to the Utah legislature, not to this court.
If this income test argument which is advanced by the
County is adopted then large blocks of land in Utah which are
in agricultural production, i.e. "actively devoted to agricultural use", will no longer fit within Utah's Farmland Assessment Act.

In certain portions of this state substantial roy-

alty income from oil and gas production is paid to farmers as a
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result of petroleum production from reserves underlying those
farmers' properties.

Under

the County's view,

this

royalty

income could operate to disqualify these lands for agricultural
assessment.
result.
did not

Certainly, Utah's legislature never intended this

It may be this is the reason why Utah's legislature
include a comparative

income test in Utah's Farmland

Assessment Act as is a requirement for agricultural assessment
in some other states.

See W.R. Company v. North Carolina Prop-

erty Tax Comm., 48 NC App. 245, 269 S.E.2d 636 (1980).
In order to infuse some measure of credibility in its
argument,

the County has sought

the definition of

"devoted"

from numerous sources including case law speaking to recreational use of property, i.e. Otis Lodge, Inc. v. Comm. of Taxation

295 Minn. 80, 206 N.W.2d 3 (1972), admiralty, Complaint

of McLinn, 744 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1984), and Webster's Ninth
New Collegiate Dictionary.
to agricultural

This may well be useful if "devoted

use" has a vague or uncertain meaning

Utah's Farmland Assessment Act.

under

However, the meaning of the

term "actively devoted to agricultural use" in the Utah Farmland Assessment Act is clear from the context within which the
term is used.
Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-88 (1974), supra, states that
"land shall be deemed to be in agricultural use when devoted to
[i.e. being used for the purpose of] raising of plants and animals useful to man, . . ."

Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-91
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(1974)

imposes a rollback tax on land which has been assessed under
the Farmland Assessment Act when the land is "applied to a use
other than agricultural, . • ."

Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-95(1)

(Supp. 1986) provides that application for assessment under
Utah's Farmland Assessment Act for "taxation of land in agricultural use under this act. . ." is to be on a form promulgated by the Commission.

Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-96

(1974)

states that agricultural assessment is to continue so long as
the land remains in agricultural use.

It reads as follows:

Continuance of valuation, assessment and
taxation under this act shall depend upon
continuance of the land in agricultural use
and compliance with the other requirements
of this act and not upon continuance in the
same owner of title to the land. Liability
to the roll-back tax shall attach when a
change in use of the land occurs but not
when a change in ownership of the title
takes place if the new owner continues the
land in agricultural use, under the conditions prescribed in this act.
Obviously, the Utah legislature in enacting the Utah Farmland
Assessment Act intended that the only relevant criteria for
determining assessment under the Act was to be the actual use
of the property.

Kennecott's property is used for agricultural

purposes, and should be assessed under Utah's Farmland Assessment Act.
Maryland has a statute similar to Utah's in permitting

assessment

for agricultural purposes under a Farmland

Assessment Act when the land is "actively devoted to farm or
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agricultural
Montgomery
(1963).

use,"

See

Supervisor

of

Assessments

for

County y, Alsop, 232 Md. 188, 192 A.2d 484, 485
In

the

Alsop

case,

supra,

the Maryland

Court

of

Appeals, (Maryland's highest court), considered whether or not
an owner of property, who acquired the property for purposes of
a country estate, in order to obtain "peace of mind", with no
intention of farming the property or becoming a farmer, could
have his property

qualify

for

agricultural

assessment

under

Maryland's Farmland Assessment Act if he "permitted a neighboring farmer to graze his cattle on the property, and to use some
of the buildings thereon in return for keeping the hay cut and
doing

general

maintenance

work

on

without monetary consideration." Id.
Tax

Court,

assessment.
and

the

trial

in

about

the

property,

In that case the Maryland

that

case,

denied

farmland

In reviewing the Maryland Tax Court's decision,

in determining

assessment

court

or

under

that the property at
Maryland's

Farmland

issue qualified

Assessment

Maryland Court of Appeals stated as follows:
The tax court seems to have misconstrued both the letter and policy of the
constitutional
and statutory
provisions
and, by so doing, misapplied the law to the
facts.
Not only did the Legislature
declare that it was in the general public
interest that farming be fostered and
encouraged in order to maintain readily
available sources of food and dairy products, to promote the continued preservation
of open spaces and to prevent the forced
conversation of such spaces to more intensive uses as a result of economic pressures
caused by the assessment of land at a rate
-19-

Act,

for
the

incompatible with the practical use of such
land for farming or other agricultural
purposes;
but
the
constitutional
and
statutory provisions are explicit that the
assessment of farm land shall be based on a
valuation commensurate with the use of such
land for farming. We think the application
of the law to the facts of this case
impelled the finding of a taxable basis
that was favorable to the taxpayer rather
than
the
taxing
authority.
[Citations
omitted].
As we see it, the question here is not
whether the owner and taxpayer is personally engaged in a bona fide farm operation
or is permitting a neighbor to use the land
for grazing cattle without monetary consideration, but instead is whether the land is
actively devoted to a "farm or agricultural
use."
We think it was so used.
Id. 192
A.2d 486-87.
Just

as

in

Alsop,

Kennecott's

devoted to an agricultural use.

land

is

actively

The property is farmed; beef

cattle are raised and red winter wheat is grown.

It should be

assessed under Utah's Farmland Assessment Act.
II.

NEITHER UTAH'S PRIVILEGE TAX, NOR PROPERTY
TAX EXEMPTION LAW, APPLIES TO THIS CASE.
The County seeks to obtain, via the back door, what

it cannot obtain by the front door.

It does so by arguing that

if Kennecott's land qualifies for agricultural assessment then
Kennecott should be required to pay a privilege tax on the difference between the property's assessment for agricultural purposes

and

its

assessment

otherwise.

S 59-13-73 (Supp. 1986).
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See

Utah

Code

Ann.

However, the privilege tax, by its own terms, only
applies

to

Kennecott's

property
property

which
is not

"is

exempt

exempt.

from

Under

taxation."

Utah's

Farmland

Assessment Act this property is simply assessed on a different
basis than is other property.

The property is much like mining

property, i.e. not exempt but assessed on a different basis and
by a different method than other property.
Sec. 4, Utah Constitution.

See Article XIII,

Kennecott still pays taxes on this

property and will pay taxes even if the property
under Utah's Farmland Assessment Act.

is assessed

In fact, this property

will have the same tax levy applied against its assessed value
as is applied against the assessed value of all other taxable
property in the same taxing district.
The assessment of this property as agricultural property does not constitute an exemption as argued by the County.
The exemptions to which Utah's privilege tax apply are set out
in Article 13, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution.

Article 13,

Section 3(2) of the Utah Constitution is that provision which
enables the legislature to prescribe by statute that land used
for agricultural
agricultural use.

purposes

is to be

assessed

based

upon

its

Agricultural assessment does not constitute

an exemption to which the privilege tax applies.
If the privilege tax were to apply, Utah's Farmland
Assessment Act would become completely meaningless.

Under the

County's argument, any property owner whose property qualified
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for agricultural assessment would be subject to privilege taxes
on any difference between agricultural value, or assessment,
and assessment based upon "fair market or full market value."
This cannot be what the legislature intended, or what the people

of

the State of Utah

intended, when Utah's

legislature

enacted the privilege tax statute, when the legislature enacted
the Utah Farmland Assessment Act, or when the people of this
state

adopted

Article

XIII,

Section

3(2)

of

the

Utah

Constitution.

property

The

County

argues

tax

exemptions

that

in the

the

case

law dealing

State of Utah

and

with

elsewhere

applies in construing the language of the Utah Farmland Assessment Act.

The argument

is that because exemptions are to be

narrowly construed, the benefit of Utah's Farmland Assessment
Act is to be narrowly extended so as to preclude Kennecott's
benefitting

from

that

statute.

However,

as

is pointed

out

above, agricultural assessment is not an exemption to which the
case law addressing exemptions applies.

This becomes obvious

when one examines the Utah constitutional provisions relating
to taxation

found

in Article XIII of the Utah

Constitution.

Utah Constitution Article XIII, Sec. 3, provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
The legislature shall provide by law a
uniform and equal rate of assessment on all
tangible property in the state, according
to its value in money, except as otherwise
provided in Section 2 of this Article.
[Emphas is added].
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Article
taxation in Utah.

XIIIf

Section

2 lists

tae exemptions

from

Article XIII, Section 3 of the Utah Consti-

tution refers to Article XIII, Section 2 in speaking to property

tax

exemptions.

Article XIII, Section

3 contains

the

provision of the Utah Constitution which enables the legislature to enact the Utah Farmland Assessment Act, and to prescribe that property used for agricultural purposes
assessed based upon its agricultural use.

is to be

Thus, both the Utah

legislature and the people of Utah do not consider agricultural
assessment under the Utah Farmland Assessment Act to be either
a full or partial tax exemption.

The exemptions are set out in

the Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 2, and no exemptions are contained

in Article XIII, Section

3 of

the Utah

Constitution.
Thus, all the law, and those citations by the County
in its brief relating to tax exemptions, how exemptions are to
be construed, and who is to benefit from exemptions, simply do
not apply

in this case.

Agricultural

assessment

is not the

same, and cannot be considered to be the same, as tax exemption
under Utah law.
CONCLUSION
Kennecott, in leasing this property to Johnson Cattle
Company and Don Rushton for the production of beef cattle and
red winter wheat, has "actively devoted" its land to an agricultural

use.

Because

that

land
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is actively devoted

to an

agricultural use, and has been devoted for at least two years
prior

to

1985,

generates

because

the

agricultural

use

of

in excess of $1,000 per year in gross

this

land

income, and

because this land has had an application properly submitted, it
must be assessed under Utah's Farmland Assessment Act.
The Utah legislature, in enacting the Utah Farmland
Assessment Act, and the people of Utah in adopting Article 13,
Section 3(2) of the Utah Constitution,

intended to encourage

landowners to keep their land in agricultural production.
is precisely what

is being achieved

in this case.

That

Hercules

needs this property in order to buffer its rocket manufacturing
facilities

from

neighboring

habitable dwellings.
entered

into

a

landowners

who

might

construct

In order to achieve that buffer, Hercules

lease

with

Kennecott.

Both

Kennecott

and

Hercules have continued to lease the property for agricultural
production

purposes.

The

land

is

used

for

agricultural

production.
As a result, the decision of the Commission should be
affirmed

and

the

County

should

be

required

to

property under the Utah Farmland Assessment Act.
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assess

this

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /iT^day of March, 1968.

KENT W. WINTERHOLLER
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Respondent
185 South State Street, Suite 70u
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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BRIEF
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correct
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copies

COMMISSION

following

on

of
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the

foregoing
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this /SL^r

March, 1988:
Mr. Maxwell A. Miller
Assistant Attorney General
130 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Glen E. Davies, Esq.
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bill Thomas Peters
Special Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
Kinghorn, Peters, Probst & Sloan
No. 9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

222-.030888A

-26-

EX
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day of

ADDENDUM
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Sec. 2. [Tangible property to be taxed — Value ascer
tained — Exemption of state and municipal prop
erty — Exemption of tangible personal property
held for sale or processing — Exemption of prop
erty used for irrigating land — Exemption o
property used for electrical power — Remittance
or abatement of taxes of poor — Exemption or
residential and household property — Disabled
veterans' exemption — Intangible property —
Legislature to provide annual tax for state.]
(1) All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and
equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law.
(2) The following are property tax exemptions:
(a) The property of the state, school districts, and public libraries;
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, special districts, and all
other political subdivisions of the state, except that to the extent and in
the manner provided by the Legislature the property of a county, city,
town, special district or other political subdivision of the state located
outside of its geographic boundaries as defined by law may be subject to
the ad valorem property tax;
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for
religious, charitable or educational purposes;
(d) Places of burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit; and
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as defined by statute. This
exemption shall be implemented over a period of time as provided by
statute.
(3) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., which is
held for sale or processing and which is shipped to final destination outside
75

Art. XIII, § 2

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

this state within twelve months may be deemed by law to have acquired no
situs in Utah for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and may be exempted by law from such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or produced or otherwise originating within or without the state.
(4) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., held for
sale in the ordinary course of business and which constitutes the inventory of
any retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may
be deemed for purposes of ad valorem property taxation to be exempted.
(5) Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants,
transmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or corporations for irrigating land within the state owned by such individuals or
corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be exempted from taxation to the extent that they shall be owned and used for such purposes.
(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and other property used for
generating and delivering electrical power, a portion of which is used for
furnishing power for pumping water for irrigation purposes on lands in the
state of Utah, may be exemptedfromtaxation to the extent that such property
is used for such purposes. These exemptions shall accrue to the benefit of the
users of water so pumped under such regulations as the Legislature may
prescribe.
(7) The taxes of the poor may be remitted or abated at such times and in
such manner as may be provided by law.
(8) The Legislature may provide by law for the exemption from taxation: of
not to exceed 45% of the fair market value of residential property as defined
by law; and all household furnishings, furniture, and equipment used exclusively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in maintaining a home for
himself andt family.
(9) Property owned by disabled persons who served in any war in the military service of the United States or of the state of Utah and by the unmarried
widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of persons who while
serving in the military service of the United States or the state of Utah were
killed in action or died as a result of such service may be exempted as the
Legislature may provide.
(10) Intangible property may be exempted from taxation as property or it
may be taxed as property in such manner and to such extent as the Legislature may provide, but if taxed as property the income therefrom shall not also
be taxed. Provided that if intangible property is taxed as property the rate
thereof shall not exceed five mills on each dollar of valuation.
(11) The Legislature shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient, with
other sources of revenue, to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the
state for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state debt, if any there
be, the Legislature shall provide for levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay
the annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt, within twenty years
from the final passage of the law creating the debt.
Compiler's Notes. — The 1979 proposed
amendments to this section by House Joint
Resolutions Nos 23 and 25 were repealed and
withdrawn by Senate Joint Resolution No. 6,
Laws 1980
Laws 1980, Senate Joint Resolution No. 6,
proposed to amend Article XIII. The proposed
amendment was submitted to the electors at

the general election in 1980 and failed to pass
because it did not receive the necessary majority
'
The 1982 amendment was proposed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Laws 1982 and was
approved at the general election on November
2, 1982 to become effective January 1, 1983.
Prior to amendment, the section read as fol-
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An. xm. § 3

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 3. [Assessment and taxation of tangible property —
Livestock — Land used for agricultural purposes.]
(1) The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment on all tangible property in the state, according to its value in money,
except as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article. The Legislature shall
prescribe by law such provisions as shall secure a just valuation for taxa^on
of such property, so that every person and corporation shall p v a tax in
proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property, prowaed that the
Legislature may determine the manner and extent of taxing livestock.
(2) Land used for agricultural purposes may, as the Legislature prescribes,
be assessed according to its value for agricultural use without regard to the
value it may have for other purposes.

Sec. 4. [Mines and claims to be assessed — Basis and multiple — What to be assessed as tangible property-]
All metalliferous mines or mining claims, both placer and rock in place,
shall be assessed as the Legislature shall provide; but the basis and multiple
now used in determining the value of metalliferous mines for taxation purposes and the additional assessed value of $5.00 per acre thereof shall not be
changed before January 1, 1935, nor thereafter until otherwise provided by
law. All other mines or mining claims and other valuable mineral deposits,
including lands containing coal or hydrocarbons and all machinery used in
mining and all property or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to
mines or mining claims, and the value of any surface use made of mining
claims, or mining property for other than mining purposes, shall be assessed
as other tangible property.

PART 5
FARMLAND ASSESSMENT ACT
59-2-501. Short title.
This part is known as the "Farmland Assessment Act."
History: C. 1953, 59-5-86, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 180, § 1; renumbered by L. 1987,
ch. 4, § 103.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective February 6, 1987, renumbered
this section which was formerly § 59-5-86 and
substituted the present provisions for the former provisions which read This act shall be

known and may be cited as the Tannland Assessment Act of 1969'".
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
c n 4> § 307 provides- T h i s act has retrospect i v e operation to January 1, 1987, except for
Sections 59-2-201, 59-2-205 and 59-2-207
w h l c h u k e effect J a n
x 19gg „

84

59-5-86

REVENUE AND TAXATION

Section
59-5-97. Separation of land — Use of part

for other than agricultural
purposes.

59-5-86. Short title of act.
Law Reviews. — Preserving Utah's Open
Spaces, Owen Olpin, 1973 Utah L. Rev 164.

59-5-87. Value of land actively devoted to agricultural
use.
(1) For general property tax purposes and land subject to the privilege
tax imposed by section 59-13-73 owned by the state or any political subdivision thereof, the value of land, not less than five contiguous acres in area,
unless otherwise provided under subsection (2), which has a gross income,
not including rental income, of $1000 per year, is actively devoted to agricultural use, which has been so devoted for at least two successive years
immediately preceding the tax year in issue, shall, on application of that
owner, and approval thereof as hereinafter provided, be that value which
such land has for agricultural use.
(2) The tax commission may grant a waiver of the acreage limitation,
upon appeal by the owner and submission of proof that the owner or a
purchaser or lessee obtains 807c or more of his income from agricultural
products on an area of less than five contiguous acres.
(3) The tax commission may grant a waiver of the income limitation for
the tax year in issue, upon appeal by the owner and submission of proof
that the land has been valued on the basis of agricultural use for at least
two years immediately preceding that tax year, and that the failure to meet
the income requirements for that tax year was due to no fault or act of the
owner or a purchaser or lessee, whether that act is one of omission or
commission. "Fault" shall not be construed to include the intentional planting of crops or trees which because of the maturation period of such crops or
trees prevent the owner, purchaser, or lessee from achieving the income

59-5-88. "Agricultural use" defined.—Land shall be deemed to be in
agricultural use when devoted to the raising of plants and animals useful to
man, including but not limited to: forages and sod crops; grains and feed
crops; dairy animals, poultry, livestock, mekdiu~ beef cattle, sheep, swine,
horses, ponies, mules or goats including the breeding and grazing of any or
all of such animals; bees, fur animals, trees, fruits of all kinds, including
grapes, nuts and berries; vegetables, nursery, floral, and ornamental stock;
or when devoted to and meeting the requirements and qualifications for
payments or other compensation pursuant to a crop-land retirement program under an agreement with an agency of the state or federal government
History: C. 1953, 59-5-88, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 180, § 3.

CoUateral Eeferences.
Taxation<S=>348.
84 (U.8. Taxation § 411.

59-5-89, Land actively devoted to agricultural use — Additional requirements — Application for assessment under act — Change in land use —
Land used for religious or charitable purposes.
Land which is actively devoted to agricultural use is eligible for valuation, assessment and taxation each year it meets the following
qualifications:
(1) It has been so devoted for at least the two successive years immediately preceding the tax year for which valuation under this act is
requested;
(2) The area of land is not less than five contiguous acres when
measured in accordance with the provisions of section 59-5-94, except
where devoted to agricultural use in conjunction with other eligible
acreage, and when the gross sales of agricultural products produced
thereon together with any payments received under a crop-land retirement program have averaged at least $1000 per year, not including
rental income, during the two year period immediately preceding the
tax year in issue; and
(3) (a) Application by the owner of the land for valuation hereunder
is submitted on or before January 1 of the tax year to the county
assessor in which the land is situated on the form prescribed by the
state tax commission. The county assessor shall continue to accept
applications filed within 60 days after January 1 upon payment of
a late filing fee in the amount of $25, which shall be paid to the
county treasurer.
(b) The county assessor shall have all applications filed under
subsection (a) recorded by the county recorder. All necessary filing
fees shall be paid by the owner at the time his application is filed.
Whenever land, which is or has been in agricultural use and is or
has been valued, assessed and taxed under the provisions of this
act, is applied to a use other than agricultural, the owner shall,
within 90 days thereafter, notify the county assessor and pay the
roll-back tax imposed by section 59-5-91. Upon receipt of notice,
unless payment of the roll-back tax accompanies that notice, the
county assessor shall cause the following statement to be recorded
by the county recorder: "On the
day of
, 19
,
this land became subject to the roll-back tax imposed by section
59-5-91."
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of (3)(a) and (b) of this section, whenever the owner of land has filed or becomes eligible for
valuation under this act, he need not file again or give any notice
to the county assessor until a change in the land use occurs. Failure of the owner to notify the county assessor and pay the roll-back
tax imposed by section 59-5-91, within 90 days atter any change m
land use, will subject the owner to a penalty of 100% of the computed roll-back tax due.
(d) Any change in land use or other withdrawal of land from the
provisions of this act shall be subject to the provisions of this section whether the change or withdrawal is voluntary or involuntary, unless the change in use is due to ineligibility resulting
solely from amendments to this act.
(e) Land which becomes exempt from taxation as provided in
section 59-2-30 shall not be considered withdrawn from the provisions of this act as long as the land continues to be used for agricultural purposes.

59-5-90- "Indicia of value" for agricultural use determined by tax commission.
The assessor w "sluing land which qualifies as land actively devoted to
agricultural use under the test prescribed by this act, and as to which the
owner thereof has made timely application for valuation, assessment and
taxation hereunder for the tax year in issue, shall consider only those
indicia of value which such land has for agricultural use as determined by
the state tax commission. The county board of equalization shall review the
assessments each year as provided in section 59-7-1.
History: C. 1953, 59-5-90, enacted **y L.
1969, ch. 180, S 5; L. 1975, ch. 174, $ 3.

Compiler's Not*s, — The 1975 amendment made no change m this section.

59-5-91. Assessed land subsequently devoted to other than agricultural
use—"Roll-back tax"—Definition and determination of amount—Disposition
of collected tax.—When land which is or has been in agricultural use and
is or has been valued, assessed and taxed under the provisions of this act,
is applied to a use other than agricultural, it shall be subject to an additional tax hereinafter referred to as the "roll-back tax," which tax shall be
a lien upon the land and become due and payable at the time of the change
in use.
As used in this act, the word "roll-back" means the period preceding
the change in use of the land not to exceed five years during which the
land was valued, assessed and taxed under the provisions of this act.
The assessor shall ascertain the amount of the roll-back tax chargeable
on land which has undergone a change in use by computing the difference
between the tax paid, while participating under this act, and that which
would have been paid had the property not been under this act. When the
assessor has collected the roll-back tax, he shall remit it to the county
treasurer and certify to the county recorder that the roll-back tax lien
on the property has been satisfied.
History: C. 1953, 59-5-91, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 180, $ 6; L. 1973, ch. 137, § 3.

59-5-92. "Roll-back tax" — Lien — Right to review judgment — Procedure.
The assessment of the roll-back tax imposed by section 59-5-91, the attachment of the lien for such taxes, and the right of the owner or other
interested party to review any judgment of the county board of equalization
affecting such roll-back tax, shall be governed by the procedures provided
for the assessment and taxation of real property not valued, assessed and
taxed under the provisions of this act. The roll-back tax collected shall be
paid into the county treasury and paid by the treasurer to the various
taxing units pro rata in accordance with the levies for the current year.
History: C. 1953, 59-5-92, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 180,§ 7; L. 1975, ch. 174,5 4.

Compiler's Notes. — The 1975 amendment made no change in this section.

59-5-93. Area included under act—Site of farmhouse excluded—In determining the total area of land actively devoted to agricultural use there
shall be included the area of all land under barns, sheds, silos, cribs, greenhouses and like structures, lakes, dams, ponds, streams, irrigation ditches
md like facilities, but land under and such additional land as may be
ictually used in connection with the farmhouse shall be excluded in determining such total area.
History: C. 1953, 59-5-93, enacted by L.
1969, clL 180, § 8.

CoUateral References.
Taxation<S=348.
84 C.J.S. Taxation § 411.

59-5-94. Structures and land—Assessment same as other property.—All
structures, which are located on land in agricultural use and the farmhouse
md the land on which the farmhouse is located, together with the additional
land used in connection therewith, shall be valued, assessed and taxed by
the same standards, methods and procedures as other taxable structures and
>ther land in the county.
History: C. 1953, 59-5-94, enacted by L.
L969, ch. 180, § 9.

CoUateral References.
TaxationO=>348.
84 C.J.S. Taxation § 411.

59-5-95. Application forms — Certification by landowner — Consent to audit and review — Purchaser's or lessee's affidavit.
(1) Application for valuation, assessment and taxation ofland in agricultural use under this act shall be on a form prescribed by the state tax
commission, and provided f cr the use of th* applicants by the counfv pressor. The form of application shall provide for the reporting of information
pertinent to the provisions of this act. A certification by the owner that the
facts set forth in the application are true may be prescribed by the state tax
commission to be in lieu of a sworn statement to that effect. Statements so
certified shall be considered as if made under oath and subiect to the same
penalties as provided by law for perjury.
(2) All owners applying for participation under the provisions of this act
and all purchs'^s or lessees signing affidavits as provided under subsection (3) shall be deemed to have given their consent to be subject to field
audit and review by both the state tax commission ard the conntv assessor
and such consent shall be a condition to the acceptance of any application
or affidavit.
(3) An owner of lands eligible for valuation, assessment and taxation
under the provisions of this act due to the use of that land by, and the gross
income qualifications of, a purchaser or lessee, may qualify those lands by
submitting together with his application under subsection (1), an affidavit
from that purchaser or lessee certifying those facts relative to his use of the
land and his gross income which would be necessary for qualification of
those lands under the provisions of this act.

History: C. 1953, 59-5-95, enacted by L.
1969, eh. 180, § 10.

Collateral Beferences
Taxation<fc=>348.
84 C.J.8. Taxation § 412.

59-5-96. Change of ownership.—Continuance of valuation, assessment
and taxation under this act shall depend upon continuance of the land in
agricultural use and compliance with the other requirements of this act
and not upon continuance in the same owner of title to the land. Liability
to the roll-back tax shall attach when a change in use of the land occurs
but not when a change in ownership of the title take*, place if the new
owner continues the land in agricultural use, under the conditions prescribed in this act.
History: 0. 1953, 59-5-96, enacted by L.
1969, efa. 180, § 11.

Collateral Bcfereiices.
TExatione=*S4S.
U CJ.S. Taxation { 411.

59-13-73. Privilege tax upon possession and use of taxexempt property — Exceptions.
There is imposed and there shall be collected a tax upon the possession or
other beneficial use enjoyed by any private individual, association, or corporation of any property, real or personal, which for any reason is exempt
from taxation, when such property is used in connection with a business
conducted for profit, except where the use is by way of a concession in or
relative to the use of a public airport, park, fairground, or similar property
which is available as a matter of right to the use of the general public, or
where the possessor or user is a religious, educational or charitable organization or the proceeds of such use or possession inure to the benefit of such
religious, educational or charitable organization and not to the benefit of
any other individual association or corporation. No tax shall be imposed
upon the possession or other beneficial use of public land occupied undei
the terms of grazing leases or permits issued bv the United States or the
state of Utah or upon any easement unless the lease, permit or easement
entitles the lessee or permittee to exclusive possession of the premises to
which the lease, permit or easement relates. Every lessee, permittee, or
other holder of a right to remove or extract the mineral covered by his
lease, right, permit or easement except from brines of the Great Salt Lake
is deemed to be in possession of the premises, notwithstanding the fact that
other parties may have a similar right to remove or extract another mineral from the same lands or estates.

